Prodways Group SA
TIP
Prodways Group SA
Iemand zin om deze eens te bekijken?
Het is geen koopadvies, enkel een idee van mij aangezien 3D printing meer en meer aanwezig komt in ons dagelijkse leven.
Prodways Group SA levert 3-dimensionale drukoplossingen.
Het werkt door middel van twee divisies: Systems and Products.
De Systems divisie biedt 3D druksystemen en gerelateerde materialen, waaronder harsen en poeders.
De Products divisie produceert en verkoopt 3D-gedrukte kunststof- en metaaldelen via directe en indirecte verkoopkanalen.
Het bedrijf werd opgericht op 3 juli 2014 door André-Luc Allanic en is gevestigd in Les Mureaux, Frankrijk
Iemand die hier eens zijn licht wil over laten schijnen?
Het is geen koopadvies, enkel een idee van mij aangezien 3D printing meer en meer aanwezig komt in ons dagelijkse leven.
Prodways Group SA levert 3-dimensionale drukoplossingen.
Het werkt door middel van twee divisies: Systems and Products.
De Systems divisie biedt 3D druksystemen en gerelateerde materialen, waaronder harsen en poeders.
De Products divisie produceert en verkoopt 3D-gedrukte kunststof- en metaaldelen via directe en indirecte verkoopkanalen.
Het bedrijf werd opgericht op 3 juli 2014 door André-Luc Allanic en is gevestigd in Les Mureaux, Frankrijk
Iemand die hier eens zijn licht wil over laten schijnen?
Re: Prodways Group SA
Ik kan niet veel nuttigs zeggen over bedrijven die cash bloeden. Kan ze niet waarderen. Vind dat je met zulke bedrijven een kat in een zak koopt.
Mis geen enkele kans om te besparen.
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Re: Prodways Group SA
Heb je dat niet met alle bedrijven die nieuwe technologie op de markt brengen? Biotech zit in hetzelfde straatje. Ik begrijp je argument wel.
Re: Prodways Group SA
Ja, dat klopt. Daarom heb ik zulke bedrijven ook niet in portefeuille. Als ze geen positieve (vrije) kasstromen genereren, kan ik er niet bij benadering een waarde op plakken en weet ik dus ook niet of de huidige koers interessant is en mij indekt tegen fouten of onvoorziene omstandigheden. Mijn bedrijven zijn veeleer saai en groeien slechts traag tot gemiddeld. Ieder zijn stijl. Je had hier vroeger iemand op het forum die enkel in biotech belegde. Ik zou zijn resultaten van de afgelopen jaren wel eens naast die van mij willen leggen.
Re: Prodways Group SA
Het inderdaad moeilijk om waarde aan dit bedrijf toe te kennen. Net zoals dit ook het geval is met biotech bedrijven. Je kan er flink je broek aan scheuren maar ook serieuze winsten mee maken. Dat is echter speculeren en daar begin ik niet mee. Het is wel een interessante sector waar ik wel in geloof. Er moet toch een manier zijn om te weten te komen als dit een verborgen parel zou kunnen zijn?
Re: Prodways Group SA
Op voorhand? Nee, volgens mij niet. Voor elke Netflix of Amazon zijn er een veelvoud aan bedrijven die falen. Geen concreet antwoord op je openingspost, maar wat algemene overwegingen:
Van m'n favoriete blog:
As an investor, paying a large premium for a promising but difficult to predict future that doesn't quite materialize can be expensive. The one or two big mistakes in an otherwise sound portfolio can seriously undermine long run compounding effects.
Nog uit de blog:
Too often, when it comes to transformative industries (and individual businesses), it's difficult to avoid big mistakes. This subtracts meaningfully from overall results. Less return; more risk. Exciting prospects can lead to speculative prices. So the current winners quickly become priced for greatness. Well, what happens if they end up being just good or worse? A sufficient margin of safety is paramount because disappointments and misjudgments happen. When the future offers a wide range of outcomes -- and that's usually the case in the most transformative industries -- an even bigger margin is required.
So the price paid should protect against what might go wrong. Yet sometimes the worst likely outcomes can't be understood well enough beforehand. In those instances, no margin of safety will be sufficient. The right action becomes inaction. The avoidance of exposure altogether.
Paying a speculative price -- even if based on a fundamental view that an investment will someday justify the price paid -- eventually turns into a recipe for permanent capital loss. This approach -- that is, operating without enough margin of safety -- will work right up until it does not.
In fact, early success operating in this manner likely leads to an even bigger speculative disaster down the road. Some are willing to pay a premium upfront on the belief an investment will eventually grow into its valuation. Well, investment is not about whether something can justify its valuation someday; it's about understanding investment specific risk and the potential reward compared to alternatives.
A willingness to pay a premium price for promising prospects quickly becomes expensive if those prospects end up not quite being realized.
At times, even when it happens to be unusually clear who the winner is likely to be, the price of admission makes the future returns unattractive considering the risks and alternatives.
Yet paying too much is only part of the problem.
The other difficulty is that many businesses fail -- or at least fail to produce an attractive return on capital -- in the most dynamic industries. Business economics can be altered in unpredictable ways when there's lots of capable competitors. Not becoming exposed to the capital that's destroyed in the process is easier said than done.
Obviously, the industries exposed to constant change do sometimes produce some big winners. The problem is those same industries also tend to produce a long list of losers. Both possible outcomes should get careful consideration. Those who get too caught up in the "story" may not consider the downside carefully enough. Those who do not scrutinize for flaws in their own thinking, and instead seek confirmation they're right, can make unnecessary mistakes. What appears to have great potential today might just end up on that long list tomorrow.
Keep in mind that, overall, the technology sector has had lower long-term returns than the consumer staples sector.
Well, it seems more than fair to say that the former has been more transformative than the latter. Yet that didn't translate into above average investor returns.
Competition and the risk of technology shifts can turn sound core business economics into something else altogether. A big new opportunity where lots of innovation is taking place invites disruption from well-financed and capable new entrants to an industry.
What were expected to be high returns on capital today become rather the opposite down the road.
New competitors and capital usually go where there's exciting growth prospects; where there's some new compelling territory to potentially dominate. One or two do well. Many fail.
Subpar overall returns.
This isn't to suggest that some aren't very good at figuring out who the winners are going to be while also not paying too much for the potential. Some certainly do that sort of thing very well.
It's just easy to underestimate how difficult this is to do well on a consistent basis. Some are overly confident that they can reliably pick the winners and mostly avoid the losers.
The things that end up being transformative for the world need not -- and often do not -- enrich the investors who are willing to risk their capital.
There will be exceptions, of course, but an investment approach dependent on being the exception isn't likely to lead to great results.
It's a fallacy that being in on something early is a prerequisite for investment success.
Investing well does require lots of patience followed by decisive action when appropriate.
It requires an awareness of limitations and biases.
Van m'n favoriete blog:
As an investor, paying a large premium for a promising but difficult to predict future that doesn't quite materialize can be expensive. The one or two big mistakes in an otherwise sound portfolio can seriously undermine long run compounding effects.
Buffett: "I won't dwell on other glamorous businesses that dramatically changed our lives but concurrently failed to deliver rewards to U.S. investors: the manufacture of radios and televisions, for example. But I will draw a lesson from these businesses: The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage. The products or services that have wide, sustainable moats around them are the ones that deliver rewards to investors."
Nog uit de blog:
Too often, when it comes to transformative industries (and individual businesses), it's difficult to avoid big mistakes. This subtracts meaningfully from overall results. Less return; more risk. Exciting prospects can lead to speculative prices. So the current winners quickly become priced for greatness. Well, what happens if they end up being just good or worse? A sufficient margin of safety is paramount because disappointments and misjudgments happen. When the future offers a wide range of outcomes -- and that's usually the case in the most transformative industries -- an even bigger margin is required.
So the price paid should protect against what might go wrong. Yet sometimes the worst likely outcomes can't be understood well enough beforehand. In those instances, no margin of safety will be sufficient. The right action becomes inaction. The avoidance of exposure altogether.
Paying a speculative price -- even if based on a fundamental view that an investment will someday justify the price paid -- eventually turns into a recipe for permanent capital loss. This approach -- that is, operating without enough margin of safety -- will work right up until it does not.
In fact, early success operating in this manner likely leads to an even bigger speculative disaster down the road. Some are willing to pay a premium upfront on the belief an investment will eventually grow into its valuation. Well, investment is not about whether something can justify its valuation someday; it's about understanding investment specific risk and the potential reward compared to alternatives.
A willingness to pay a premium price for promising prospects quickly becomes expensive if those prospects end up not quite being realized.
At times, even when it happens to be unusually clear who the winner is likely to be, the price of admission makes the future returns unattractive considering the risks and alternatives.
Yet paying too much is only part of the problem.
The other difficulty is that many businesses fail -- or at least fail to produce an attractive return on capital -- in the most dynamic industries. Business economics can be altered in unpredictable ways when there's lots of capable competitors. Not becoming exposed to the capital that's destroyed in the process is easier said than done.
Obviously, the industries exposed to constant change do sometimes produce some big winners. The problem is those same industries also tend to produce a long list of losers. Both possible outcomes should get careful consideration. Those who get too caught up in the "story" may not consider the downside carefully enough. Those who do not scrutinize for flaws in their own thinking, and instead seek confirmation they're right, can make unnecessary mistakes. What appears to have great potential today might just end up on that long list tomorrow.
Keep in mind that, overall, the technology sector has had lower long-term returns than the consumer staples sector.
Well, it seems more than fair to say that the former has been more transformative than the latter. Yet that didn't translate into above average investor returns.
Competition and the risk of technology shifts can turn sound core business economics into something else altogether. A big new opportunity where lots of innovation is taking place invites disruption from well-financed and capable new entrants to an industry.
What were expected to be high returns on capital today become rather the opposite down the road.
New competitors and capital usually go where there's exciting growth prospects; where there's some new compelling territory to potentially dominate. One or two do well. Many fail.
Subpar overall returns.
This isn't to suggest that some aren't very good at figuring out who the winners are going to be while also not paying too much for the potential. Some certainly do that sort of thing very well.
It's just easy to underestimate how difficult this is to do well on a consistent basis. Some are overly confident that they can reliably pick the winners and mostly avoid the losers.
The things that end up being transformative for the world need not -- and often do not -- enrich the investors who are willing to risk their capital.
There will be exceptions, of course, but an investment approach dependent on being the exception isn't likely to lead to great results.
It's a fallacy that being in on something early is a prerequisite for investment success.
Investing well does require lots of patience followed by decisive action when appropriate.
It requires an awareness of limitations and biases.
Re: Prodways Group SA
Het is een filosofie die zeker opgaat. Toch heeft het bedrijf iets die me interesseert. De sector zeker. Ik ga niet investeren (voorlopig) maar ga ze zeker opvolgen.
Hun doel is om vanaf volgend jaar winst te maken. Zodat ze inderdaad geen cash meer bloeden. Ze hebben een mooie Q3 voorgelegd. Dat zie je ook in de koersreactie.
Er is een overname geweest en die samenwerking zit ook nog niet in de resultaten vermeld. Iets om toch verder op te volgen.
Hun doel is om vanaf volgend jaar winst te maken. Zodat ze inderdaad geen cash meer bloeden. Ze hebben een mooie Q3 voorgelegd. Dat zie je ook in de koersreactie.
Er is een overname geweest en die samenwerking zit ook nog niet in de resultaten vermeld. Iets om toch verder op te volgen.
Re: Prodways Group SA
Het is een filosofie die zeker opgaat. Toch heeft het bedrijf iets die me interesseert. De sector zeker. Ik ga niet investeren (voorlopig) maar ga ze zeker opvolgen.
Hun doel is om vanaf volgend jaar winst te maken. Zodat ze inderdaad geen cash meer bloeden. Ze hebben een mooie Q3 voorgelegd. Dat zie je ook in de koersreactie.
Er is een overname geweest en die samenwerking zit ook nog niet in de resultaten vermeld. Iets om toch verder op te volgen.
Hun doel is om vanaf volgend jaar winst te maken. Zodat ze inderdaad geen cash meer bloeden. Ze hebben een mooie Q3 voorgelegd. Dat zie je ook in de koersreactie.
Er is een overname geweest en die samenwerking zit ook nog niet in de resultaten vermeld. Iets om toch verder op te volgen.
